(1) The actualization of the man's potential to build is identical to the actualization of the materials' potential to become a house. In other words, there takes place only a single change, though this change can be described from two different perspectives-the builder's and the materials' (Phys. G 3, 202a13 -21). (2) This single change takes place in the changed rather than in the changer. For example, the building of a house occurs in the boards and stones, and not in the builder himself (Phys. G 3, 202a21ff.). (3) Although the change is localized exclusively in the changed, it is 'not cut off ' (ouÒ k a Ò potetmhme´nh) from the changer (Phys. G 3, 202b6-8).
2 1 For some general guidelines on fulfilling material requirements and so qualifying as potentially x, see Metaphysics H4-5 and Q7.
2 A completed house has the form of house as something cut off, but what is still in the process of being made into a house does not (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 445.34 -446.5). The house being built and the student being taught are subjects-not of the forms of house and knowledge-but of the changes towards those forms, and these changes surely do not occur independently of their initiators, that is, the teacher and the builder.
(4) Every change involves a transferral of form from the changer to the changed (Phys. G 2, 202a9-13).
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In what follows I shall first show how selectively Plotinus draws from this list and then make some suggestions aimed at explaining this selectivity. I shall subsequently show that Simplicius' account of this in his commentary on the Physics is directly influenced by Plotinus, although he departs from Plotinus by not shying away from any of these four features. Finally, I shall propose a possible explanation of Simplicius' divergence from Plotinus in this regard. PLOTINUS 6.3.23 is one of the last chapters of Plotinus' critical examination of the doctrine of categories in 6.1 -3 and forms part of his discussion of change (kí nhsiv) in 6.3. . The guiding question of this chapter concerns the relationship between change and sensible things, and Plotinus' primary response to this question is that change is distinct from the sensible things that are changed, even though it is only through the perception of sensible things in change that we are able to perceive the change itself. This raises the question for him of what the change is in, which brings us to lines 13 -20 (I shall explain the underlining shortly):
eÒ n tí ni ou In h Ö kí nhsiv, oÓ tan aØ llo kin}, kaì oÓ tan de`eÒ k thv eÒ nou´shv duna´mewv ei Ò v eÒ ne´rgeian iØ }; a Ira eÒ n tw ¼ kinoũnti; kaì pw v tò kinou´menon kaì pa´scon metalh yetai; aÒ llÒ eÒ n tw ¼ kinoume´nw ¼; dia`tí ou In eÒ lqoũsa ouÒ me´nei; hÕ deĩ mh´te toũ poioũntov aÒ phlla´cqai mh te eÒ n au Ò tw ¼ ei Inai aÒ llÒ eÒ x au Ò toũ me`n kaì ei Ò v eÒ keĩno, ouÒ k eÒ n eÒ keí nw ¼ de`aÒ potetmhme´nhn ei Inai, aÒ llÒ aÒ pÒ eÒ keĩnou ei Ò v eÒ keĩno, oi Fon pnoh n ei Ò v a Ø llo.
What, then, is the change in when it changes another thing, and when it goes to actuality from an immanent potentiality? Is it, then, in the changer? And how will what is passively changed participate in it? Or is it in the changed? But then why, having come, does it not remain? In fact change should neither be separated from the efficient cause (toũ poioũntov) [i.e. the changer] nor be in it; rather, it should come out of the changer to the changed -but it should not be in the changed as something cut-off [i.e. from the changer], but [go] from the changer to the changed just like a breath [breathed] into something else.
Plotinus' examination of change in connection with sensible things has led him back to the question that Aristotle poses in Phys. G 3, 202a13ff.: Is change in the changer or in the changed? Like Aristotle, Plotinus answers with (2) from the list above: change is in the changed-with two clarifications. Both are familiar from Plotinus' theory of causation, but each also corresponds to one of the four significant features of our summary of Phys. G 2, 202a9-G 3, 202b28. The first picks up on (3) from our list above, insisting that change is in the changed without being cut off from the changer (line 19).
The use of negated a Ò pote´mnein to express the continued dependence of a product on its cause is found frequently throughout the Enneads and in application to all levels of reality, for example, Intellect (5.3.12.39ff.), Soul and souls (1.1.2.9-13, 3.5.4.10-11, 4.3.12.3-4, 4.4.29.46-52, 4.9.5.6 -7), Nature (6.2.22.31-4) and the sensible world 3 'The changer will always transmit some form, either a substantial form or a qualitative form or a quantitative form' (ei Idov de`aÒ eì oi Ø setaí ti to`kinoũn, hØ toi to´de hÕ toio´nde hÕ toso´nde). When a builder builds a house, he is transferring the form of house from his soul to the potential house, that is, to the stones and boards, and for a teacher to teach a student is for the former to transmit some form of knowledge from his own soul to the latter's soul (cf. DA 417b12-16). In other words, a builder is building just in so far as he is in the process of transferring the form of house to the stones and boards, and a house is being built only in so far as it is in the process of receiving the form of house from the builder.
(2.9. 16.11-12, 4.3.9.29-31 The second clarification is that change involves transferring something 'from the changer to the changed just like a breath [breathed] into something else' (line 20), which nicely corresponds to (4) on our list. Here, too, we are dealing with a familiar feature of Plotinus' theory of causation, as the example of 'breath into something else' shows. This example-itself not found in Phys. G 3-is disappointingly concise and in itself offers little illustrative help. Yet, despite being the only instance of pnoh in the Enneads, it is solidly Plotinian. In order to understand its Plotinian sense, we need to look at several passages where Plotinus uses breath metaphors via the Greek words eÒ mpneĩn and/or aÒ napnoh to illustrate his meaning. The most central of these passages is 3.2.4.12-16:
zwh`ga`r eÒ ntaũqa kinoume´nh, eÒ keĩ de`aÒ kí nhtov. Ø Edei de`kí nhsin eÒ x a Ò kinhsí av ei Inai kaì eÒ k thv eÒ n auÒ t} zwhv th n eÒ x au Ò thv gegone´nai aØ llhn, oi Fin eÒ mpne´ousan kaì ouÒ k a Ò tremoũsan zwh`n a Ò napnoh`n thv hÒ remou´shv ou Isan.
For life here [i.e. in the sensible region] is in change, but there [i.e. in the intelligible] is unchanging. And so change must derive from changelessness, and from the life that is in changelessness comes another life that is from it -a life that, as it were, breathes (eÒ mpne´ousan) and stirs and is an exhalation (aÒ napnoh`n) of the life that rests.
The relevance of this passage to 6.3.23 should be clear: both passages concern one thing creating change in another while itself remaining unchanged. And here again the latter is likened to a breath proceeding from the former. But this time the metaphor has been placed in a more familiar background. Plotinus is thinking of ontological procession or emanation: to say that the life of change is a breath proceeding from the unchanging life is to say that the one emanates from the other.
If we reflect on Plotinus' doctrine of procession, we can see why he finds this breath metaphor so appealing. First, for those substances that do breathe, breathing is an essential activity. Indeed, it, like emanation, is an activity that proceeds without any planning or choice. Second, breathing suggests a kind of giving that does not entail any loss for the giver, just as is the case with emanation, in so far as the air exhaled is not an essential constituent of the exhaler's nature. Finally, an exhalation's existence is completely dependent on the continued activity of the exhaler, just as ontologically lower entities are dependent on the activities of the higher ones. Hence, this metaphor is particularly well suited to explain how one substance can come to be by emanating from an ontologically prior substance. 5 For another use of the metaphor, see e.g. 5.1.2.2 where Plotinus describes the soul's demiurgic function of creating living things as 'breathing' life into them (eÒ mpneu´sasa auÒ toĩv zwh´n). Likewise at 6.7.23.22 -4 where the Good is said to 'breathe' intellect, life and being into all things (eÒ mpne´on noũn, eÒ mpne´on zwh n, ei Ò de´ti mh`du´natai zhn, ei Inai). Proclus uses it in a similar manner, e.g. at In Tim. 1.383.6-7, where he says that the bodies in the pre-cosmic state have motion 'because they have been breathed into by Nature' (w Ö v u Ö po`fu´sewv eÒ mpneo´menon), and at 3.327.7 -8, where we are told that 'the soul moves the body by breathing the power of change into it' ( fe´rei me`n gà r h Ö yuch`to`sw ma du´namin eÒ mpne´ousa kinh sewv).
Hence, Plotinus describes change as a process that transfers something from the changer to the changed, a process that takes place in the changed without being cut off from the changer. What, then, of the central insight of Phys. G 3, namely (1) that the actuality (eÒ ntele´ceia) of the changer is identical to the actuality of the changed? Plotinus passes over it. This probably has little to do with Plotinus' systematic avoidance of Aristotle's term eÒ ntele´ceia, since he is quite capable of using eÒ ne´rgeia as a substitute for it. 6 It likely has much more to do with the rest of his theory of causality and emanation, which describes the procession of one level of reality out of another in terms of two eÒ ne´rgeiai, described most fully in 5.4.2.27-33: Ò Ene´rgeia hÖ me´n eÒ sti thv ou Ò sí av, hÖ dÒ eÒ k thv ou Ò sí av eÖ ká stou . kai`hÖ me`n thv ou Ò sí av auÒ to´eÒ stin eÒ ne´rgeia eÓ kaston, hÖ de`aÒ pÒ eÒ keí nhv, h× n deĩ panti`eÓ pesqai eÒ x a Ò na´gkhv eÖ te´ran ou Isan auÒ tou˜. oi Fon kaì eÒ pì toũ puro`v h Ö me´n ti´v eÒ sti sumplhroũsa th`n ouÒ sí an qermo´thv, hÖ de`aÒ pÒ eÒ keí nhv hØ dh ginome´nh eÒ nergoũntov eÒ keí nou th`n sú mfuton t} ouÒ sí a ¼ eÒ n tw ¼ me´nein pũr. OuÓ tw dh`kaÒ keĩ.
The one kind of activity of each thing is of substance, the other is from substance. And the activity of substance is each thing itself, whereas the activity from substance is that which must necessarily follow everything, being different from it. For example, even in the case of fire, there is one heat that fills its substance, and another heat that immediately comes from that heat when the fire, in remaining fire, exercises the activity that is intrinsic to its substance. So, too, in the intelligible region.
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Each level of reality has its own internal activity which constitutes its substance and to this extent remains in it, but this activity automatically brings forth a second, external activity which passes on some derivative form of its substance to something else. Plotinus employs this distinction throughout the Enneads, albeit through a number of different expressions: what is called h Ö thv ouÒ sí av (eÒ ne´rgeia) in the preceding quotation is also referred to as (hÖ ) eÒ n eÖ autw 1 or auÒ t} (2.9.8.22-3, 3.7.12.7, 6.2.22.26) as well as eÒ nto´v (4.5.7.16)-hence the designation 'internal 8 -pro`v au Ò th n (3.7.12.7) and su´mfuton t} ouÒ sí a ¼ (5.4.2.32). And hÖ eÒ k (or a Ò po`) thv ouÒ sí av (eÒ ne´rgeia) is also referred to as (h Ö ) eÒ x or parÒ auÒ toũ (6.2.22.26-7, 5.1.6.34, cf. 6.7.18.6), ei Ò v a Ø llo (2.9.8.23) or ei Ò v to`po´rrw (4.5.7.19, 21, 22), pro`v to`eØ xw (4.5.7.34, 5.1.6.31-2) eÒ n poih sei kaì gene´sei (3.7.12.7 -8) and eÒ ne´rgeia deute´ra (4.5.7.16), whereby its similarity and derivativeness is often underlined with terms such as oÖ moí wma (4.5.7.18), ei Ø dwlon (4.5.7.44), perí lamyiv (5.1.6.28), eiÒ kẃ n (5.1.6.33), i Ø cnov (5.3.7.24).
Although sometimes it looks as though Plotinus means to identify an entity with its prior's external activity, 9 strictly speaking this is not quite right. The external activity that proceeds, for example, from the One is not Noũv itself but, as it were, a precursor to Noũv which Plotinus sometimes calls '(undefined) life'. This prior activity becomes 6 Plotinus employs eÒ ntele´ceia only eleven times. Of these, ten are in 4.7. 7 The double activity theory also comes up in 2.9.8.22 -5, 3.7.12.6-8, 4.5.7.15ff., 5.1.6.28 -39, 5.3.7.23 -4, 5.9.8.13 -15, 6.2.22.24-9, 6.7.18.5 -6, 6.7.21.4 -6, 6.7.40.21-4. And see C. Rutter, 'La doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de Plotin', Revue philosophique 146 (1956), 100-6. 8 Cf. the frequent use of me´nein 4.5.7.19, 5.1.6.30ff., 5.4.2.33, and so on. 9 E.g. 5.3.12.39-41 where the hypostasis Noũv is described as 'the activity that, as it were, flows from it [i.e. the One] like light from the sun' (th n me`n a Ò pÒ auÒ toũ oi Fon rÖ ueĩsan eÒ ne´rgeian w Ö v aÒ po`hÖ lí ou fw v).
Noũv when it turns back to its source, the One, and becomes defined.
10 This turningback is the next internal activity in the series and is identical to Noũv itself. For this reason, the external activity can also be referred to as h Ö pro`v to`ka´tw (6.2. 22.30) , and the internal activity as hÖ pro`v tò a Ø nw (6.2. 22.29-30) .
This theory of double activity efficiently ties together (2)-(4) from our list above. (4) A prior substance, that is, the internal activity, sends out from itself an external activity. (3) This external activity is continuously dependent on its source, and so is not 'cut off' from it. Note that even Plotinus' favourite images for a thing's not being 'cut off' from its cause, light and images in mirrors, are also-along with the heat of fire 11 -his preferred examples for double activity: light (4.5.7.33 -44, 5.1.6.29-30) and images in mirrors (4.5.7.44-50). Moreover, (2) the external activity, qua external, occurs outside of its source, or as Plotinus at one point says, eÒ n a Ø llw ¼ (5.3.7.25). But (1) is incompatible with this theory in so far as the activity of the changer, that is, the internal activity, is not numerically identical to the activity of the changed, the external activity. Rather, the latter is only a oÖ moí wma of the former.
SIMPLICIUS
We have strong textual reasons for believing that Simplicius, in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, is directly influenced by these lines of Plotinus. As part of his discussion of Phys. G3, 202a13-21, Simplicius writes: e× n ouÑ n eÒ sti tw 1 uÖ pokeime´nw ¼ hÖ eÒ ne´rgeia kaì to`pa´qov aÒ rcome´nh me`n a Ò po`tou˜eÒ nergoũntov, kaì eÒ keĩqen to`ei Idov eÒ pife´rousa, eÒ nsthrizome´nh de`tw 1 pá sconti, kaì diatiqeĩsa toũto kata`th`n a Ò po`toũ poioũntov toũ ei Ø douv eØ ndosin oi Fon pnoh n ei Ò v a Ø llo, w Ö v mh te a Ò phlla´cqai toũ poioũntov mh te eÒ n auÒ tw 1 ei Inai, aÒ llÒ eÒ x eÒ keí nou me´n, eÒ n eÒ keí nw ¼ de`ouÒ k a Ò potetmhme´nhn. kaì ei Ò me`n a Ò po`toũ pooioũntov kaì kinoũntov aÒ rcoí meqa, poieĩn kaì kineĩn eÒ stin, ei Ò de`aÒ po`toũ pá scontov kaì kinoume´nou, pa´scein kaì kineĩsqai. i Ò ste´on de`oÓ ti eÒ n tou´tw ¼ tw 1 cwrí w ¼ oi Ö me`n polloì safe´steron ouÓ tw gra´fousi tau´thn th`n le´xin. "eÒ ntele´ceia gá r eÒ sti tou´tou uÖ po`toũ kinhtikou," oÖ de`"ndro´nikov ouÓ twv . "eÒ ntele´ceia ga´r eÒ sti toũ kinhtoũ kaì uÖ po`tou´tou." kaì eÒ xhgeĩtai oÓ ti ka Õ n eØ xwqen } I tok inoũn, eÒ k thv eÒ nou´shv duna´mewv ei Ò v eÒ ne´rgeian aÒ go´menon, uÖ fÒ eÖ autoũ kineĩsqai dokeĩ to`kinou´menon.
(in Phys. 440.5-17)
The agency then, is one in substrate with the patiency; 12 it begins from the agent and from here brings the form, but is implanted in the patient; and it manages this by imparting the form from the efficient cause, just like a breath into something else, so that it is neither separated from the efficient cause nor in it-rather, it comes out of the one, and is in the other though not as something cut off [i.e. from the changer].
13 And if we begin from the efficient cause and the changer, [change] is to act and to change, but if we start from the patient and the changed, [change] is to be acted on and to be changed. And one should know that in this spot most write this passage rather clearly as follows: 'For it is the actualization of this by the source of change.' But Andronicus writes it this way: 'For it is the actualization of the changed and by this.' And he takes this to mean that even when the changer is external, the changed seems to be changed by itself, since it is brought to actuality from an immanent capacity.
As the underlining illustrates, this passage has such remarkable philosophical and linguistic similarities to 6.3.23.13-20 that we can conclude that Simplicius is drawing directly on Plotinus here. This has gone unnoticed by both Henry and Schwyzer in 10 6.7. their edition of Plotinus' Enneads and by Diels in his edition of Simplicius' commentary on the Physics. It is, of course, possible that Plotinus and Simplicius are both consulting some unknown third source. After all, it is well known that Plotinus frequently engages with the thought of his philosophical predecessors without explicitly mentioning them by name. This anonymity sometimes takes the form of a subjectless fá si or fh si, 14 but Plotinus often does not even show his readers this courtesy.
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Further, this form of engagement is not limited to only polemical contexts. He might, for example, approvingly quote or paraphrase a line of Hesiod (4.3.14.7), Homer (1.6.8.16), or any number of philosophers (cf. 5.9.5.29-32)-again without the slightest indication that he is doing so. Hence, readers are constantly confronted with the problem of identifying not only Plotinus' philosophical opponents but also his philosophical debts, and they confront it in a particularly acute form when he is dealing with post-Hellenistic philosophers, since as a rule he does not refer by name to anyone after Epicurus (to whom he refers at 2.9.15.8). Moreover, it is well known that throughout Plotinus' examination of the Aristotelian categories in 6.1-3 he drew on the work of commentators such as Lucius and Nicostratus. 16 It might seem quite likely, then, that Plotinus, while pondering Aristotle's question, selectively helped himself to some of the ideas he found in a commentary. One might even suspect that Plotinus' source was Andronicus, since it is in connection with Andronicus that Simplicius uses the phrase 'to actuality from an immanent capacity'-a phrase that we find word for word in 6.3.23.13 -20 as well. 17 Nevertheless, I believe the Plotinian character of the 'breath' metaphor that we established above gives us good reason to conclude that this is a case where Simplicius is simply drawing on Plotinus.
In this brief passage one can see that Simplicius acknowledges all four features listed above: (1) the actualization of the changer is identical to that of the changed (lines 5-6); 18 (4) change involves a transferal of a form from the changer to the changed (lines 7-8); and (2) it is localized in the changed (line 9), but (3) is not 'cut-off' from the changer (line 10). And so what we have in Simplicius is a Neoplatonist exegete of Aristotle who, on the one hand, incorporates some of Plotinus' insights into his interpretation of this passage, but who, on the other hand, is-unlike Plotinus-unbothered by the identification of the two actualizations. This, of course, raises the question of why this identification seems so objectionable to one Neoplatonist but not to the other, and I would like to venture an answer to this question.
As we have seen above, Plotinus' hesitation with respect to (1) probably derived from his theory of double activity, and so Simplicius' willingness to agree to (1) suggests that he did not adopt this theory. Indeed, I suspect this was the case. It is true that the structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics that one encounters in Simplicius bears many similarities to that of Plotinus, including much of the language of procession. 19 Both, for example, speak of lower substances 'proceeding (proï e´nai)
20 from' and 'enjoying' (a Ò polau´nein) 21 'radiation' (eØ llamyiv or perila´myiv) from their priors. 22 But nowhere, I claim, does Simplicius explain procession by means of Plotinus' theory of double activity. There is, of course, no great proof stone for such negative claims. Nevertheless, this claim can be partially verified by checking to see what Simplicius has to say about Plotinus' favourite examples of double activity-light, heat and the images in mirrors-as well as by searching the Simplician corpus 23 to see if he uses the designations for internal and external activity that Plotinus uses. Investigation shows that Simplicius does not make use of Plotinus' designations. The closest we get is a passage in his commentary on the Physics where he provides a long quotation of Damascius in which the theory seems to appear. 24 Otherwise we find only some discussion of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality. 25 But Simplicius does not distinguish the activity thv ou Ò sí av from that eÒ k (or a Ò po`) thv ou Ò sí av, 26 nor that pro`v tò aØ nw from that pro`v tò ka´tw, nor that eÒ n eÖ autw ¼ (or auÒ t}) from that eÒ x (or parÒ ) auÒ toũ.
Moreover, we can see that none of Plotinus' three examples is employed by Simplicius to explain double activity. Regarding the nature of light, Simplicius is even rather non-committal at times. 27 As for heat, even when Simplicius does draw the distinction between the heat that is proper to fire (that is, the internal activity) and the heat that fire produces in another thing (that is, the external activity), he does so without using the language of the double activity theory. 28 And Simplicius simply does not make much use of mirrors. 29 All of this, I believe, points to the conclusion that Simplicius does not employ Plotinus' distinction between internal and external activity. If this is right, it perhaps does not imply that Simplicius' views on the metaphysics of procession are all that different from Plotinus', but at the very least it would show that there is sometimes a considerable difference in the way he goes about describing those views. 30 
